Re: tempest monitoring of key bit flips

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Simon R Knight (srk@tcp.co.uk)
Thu, 18 Jun 1998 22:52:11 0000


> It does make good reading. However, I have a problem with the idea
> of continual bit-flipping key bits. It seems like a tempest monitoring
> dream. I'd imagine that even for an incredibly very week signal,
> if you monitored the rf given off for the memory (or cache) bus
> and performed a simple statistical analysis on the results, you
> could quite easily infer the key from the regular pattern of key
> - key inverse.

This sounds like an advanced kind of attack considering the degree of
parasitic radiation within a PC, but is certainly an interesting
possibility to reflect upon. Perhaps more significant would be the
simplicity with which an OS could detect such bit inversions, which
suggests an approach that would actively disguise the process.
This would also have the positive advantage of making a TEMPEST
attack of this kind more challenging. It would be fascinating to
conduct some tests in this direction; one could practice by picking
up the serial data transmissions from an ATM's card reader ! : )

Simon


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The following archive was created by hippie-mail 7.98617-22 on Fri Aug 21 1998 - 17:18:41 ADT