Re: quantum cryptanalysis

Ulrich Kuehn (kuehn@ESCHER.UNI-MUENSTER.DE)
Tue, 2 Feb 1999 13:10:40 +0100 (MET)

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lcs Mixmaster Remailer writes:
> Second, quantum computers will already threaten much cryptography in
> use today. They would be able to factor numbers and find discrete logs,
> breaking the public key systems. For symmetric ciphers, they effectivelly
> halve the key length, which might even allow breaking 128 bit ciphers.
> (Which is why the new AES will support keys up to 256 bits.)
>
Can you explain the halfing effect on the key length? Or may be you
have some pointers to the literature on that?

Ciao,
Ulrich

-- 
Ulrich Kuehn ------------------ ukuehn@acm.org
                    kuehn@math.uni-muenster.de
        http://wwwmath.uni-muenster.de/~kuehn/

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